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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

WILLIE FOLKES,

:

Case No. 14330

Defendant-Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1)(ii) (1953), in the Third District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay E.
Banks, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Willie Folkes, was convicted by a jury of the
crime of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute for value on November 12, 1974, before the Honorable
Jay E. Banks, of the Third Judicial District Court.

The defendant

was sentenced by the court to serve, one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison, the indeterminate term of imprisonment which is
provided by law.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of guilt entered
against him and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 2:00 a.m. on May 26, 1974, two policemen
(Officers Bell and Niemann) were stationed on the roof of the Rio
Grand Products Building making observations of the street below
for the purpose of facillitating the arrest of certain individuals
unconnected with the present case (R. 3,32, 33, 51). While in the
process of gathering data for those arrests, Officer Bell heard voices
emanating from a second story apartment of the Baywood Apartment
house which is immediately adjacent to the Rio Grand Products Building.
Officer Bell testified that he saw a hand holding a syringe reach from a
window of that apartment and squirt a clear substance into the alleyway
(R.33).

Officer Bell watched this activity for a short period of time

and then signalled to his partner (Niemann) to join him beneath the
window (R.33,34).

The officers then together sat down immediately

adjacent to the window of the apartment on the window ledge. The
officers, desirous of getting close to the window to observe the
activities occurring inside the apartment, positioned themselves on
each side of the window at a distance of one foot from the defendant
(R.37,51).

Sitting in this position, the officers observed the

movements and overheard the conversations of the appellant and the
other occupants of the apartment by peering through the apartment's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

kitchen window.

The officers observed activities which led them to

believe that illegal drug use was in progress (R.3, 33, 34, 37).
Officer Bell, from his vantage point, was able to observe the
appellant walk into the bedroom and obtain an amber colored bottle
from which gelatin capsules were produced (R. 36,37).

Officer

Bell at no time communicated this information to Officer Niemann.
Officer Niemann did not observe this activity in connection with the
amber colored bottle (R.6).

After two and one half hours

of this

observation, one of the officers made a noise which drew the attention
of the appellant.

The appellant signalled to the other occupants

of the apartment to be quiet while he proceeded into the bedroom
to investigate the noise (R.40).

The appellant opened the

bedroom window and stuck his head through it. At that time,
Officer Niemann identified himself, and with revolver drawn, entered
the apartment through the bedroom window (R. 6,41).

Officer Bell

then stuck his revolver through the screen of the kitchen window and
ordered one of the occupants to stand where he was. Once Officer
Niemann had secured the kitchen area, Officer Bell entered the apartment
by climbing through the bedroom window and climbing over the bed
next to the window.

The appellant and the other occupants were then

arrested in the kitchen (R. 6, 41). Upon the defendant's arrest
he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back in the kitchen
(R. 6, 94, 99). Officer Niemann then proceeded to make a cursory
search of the entire apartment (R.84).

The search disclosed an amber

colored bottle on a dresser in the bedroom (R.6,84).

The bedroom was

dark and the officer could not detect what, if anything, was in the
bottle (R. 6,7). Officer Niemann had never seen the bottle during the
alleged illegal drug activity, and indeed, saw it for the first
Digitized by thethe
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undertaken after the defendant had been arrested and handcuffed away from
the bedroom in the kitchen.

The bottle, containing gelatin capsules

filled with heroin, was introduced as evidence against the defendant
at his trial.

The police surveillance and arrest were made without

a search or arrest warrant (R.8).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SURVEILLANCE TECHNIQUE EMPLOYED BY THE POLICE,
CONSTITUTED AN INVASION OF THE APPELLANTS RIGffiTTO
PRIVACY SUCH THAT ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT
THEREOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED AT TRIAL.
The seminal case on right to privacy in Utah is State v. Kent,
20 U.2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967).

In this case, based on an informant's

tip that the defendant was involved in a number of drugstore burglaries,
a police officer requested permission and obtained it from a motel
manager to use a hidden vantage point to maintain surveillance of the
defendant in his motel unit. With the consent of the manager, the police
officer entered the attic of the motel and peered through a ventilator
located in the ceiling of the bathroom of the unit in which the defendant
was staying.

From this vantage point, the officer observed the entire

bathroom and part of the bedroom.

This surviellance was undertaken

prior to the officer's procurement of a search warrant.
this Court held that such surveillance

In Kent

was an unlawful invasion of the

defendant's privacy rendering all the evidence seized by the police
as a result of this surveillance and subsequent search inadmissible
in the prosecution of the defendant for unlawful possession of a narcotic
drug.

The Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact

that the observation
the
defendant
had Clark
notLawrequired
the police to
Digitized by theof
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take any affirmative action such as removing vent covers or technically
trespassing under common law property concepts.
Applying reasoning that foreshadowed the United States Supreme
Court case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), this Court
dismissed the State's contention that the defendant's conviction
and the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence
should be affirmed on the ground that there was no

physical trespass

or unlawful entry into the premises of the defendant.

Citing

Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), this Court said that the
determination of whether there has been an intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area of privacy does not rest on whether there has been a
trespass according to local property law.

Instead, it was noted that

although there may or may not be a trespass according to property laws,
the gravamen of the harm is the injury to the individual's
constitutionally protected right to privacy.

The court emphasized

that the home, even though it is merely a room in a motel, is a
sanctuary, and a place where an individual has a right to be "free
from outside intrusion and observation; a place inviolate where he could
repose in security."

(432 P.2d at 69) The obvious historical implications

of intruding into one's abode in a free democratic society were noted
by this Court.

Fourth Amendment protections are just as inviolable

in a motel room; and with only a few exceptions, a motel manager's
consent was held not constitutionally sufficient to justify an officer
making a warrantless search of a tenant's premises:

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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We are of the opinion the defendant, in renting the motel
unit, obtained the exclusive right to use it, which
included the right to privacy. It is true that this
right may be forfeited by illegal use of the property, but
such unlawful utilization must first be established by
legal means.
(20 U.2d at 1, 8, 432 P.2d at 68-69)
The ratio decidendi enunciated in Kent inheres in the instant
case with the same compelling logic. Although there was no

initial

trespass or physical entry into the appellant1s apartment, it is clear
that under Kent, the surveillance made by the officers who eavesdropped
without a search warrant by sitting on the appellant's window
ledge violated the right to privacy in one's own home assured by the
Fourth Amendment and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah Constitution.
Private conversations as well as physical items are within the
protection of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The landmark United States Supreme Court

case of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), also stands
for the proposition that eavesdropping activities employed by the
government constitute a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.

In Katz, the government officers overheard the

defendant's private telephone conversation by means of an electronic
eavesdropping devise attached to the exterior of a telephone booth.
In holding that the overheard conversations were the product of an
illegal search and seizure, the United States Supreme Court said:
"The Government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." (389 U.S. at 353).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment protects not only
property interests but protects all private activities of an individual,
the Court in Katz, further stated:
"For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection [Citations Omitted] But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public
may be constitutionally protected.!! (Emphasis Supplied)
(389 U.S. at 351)
It is evident from Katz, and Kent that the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution!- protects that which one seeks to
preserve as private as well as an individual's property rights. This
protection extends far beyond tangible personal items and includes
intangibles such as private conversations. Hence, a judicially authorized
search warrant based on probable cause is a mandatory requirement for
the seizure of private conversations and activities.

Berger v. New

York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Prior to the Katz and Kent decisions, surveillance activities,
standing alone, without actual physical entry by the police upon the
premises, did not constitute a search and seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438

(1928) Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942).

However, the

United States Supreme Court in Katz, overruling Olmstead and Goldman,
both specifically rejected the contention that a search, for purposes
T". As well as Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution which provides
in language similar to the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people
to be secure in this persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.ff
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of the Fourth Amendment, required physical entry onto the premises
and held that police surveillance of private conversations, without
actual entry or penetration onto premises, constituted an illegal search
and seizure. At one juncture the Court said:
ft

[I]t becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment [the
Fourth Amendment] cannot turn upon the presence or absence"
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure
~.
The fact that the electronic device employed . ~ . did not
happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no
constitutional significance.ff (389 U.S. at 353) (Emphasis
Supplied)
Applying Katz, to the present case, it is important to recognize
that the appellant's private conversations and activities which took
place from 2:00 to 4:00 a.m. on May 26, 1974, within the confines
of his private residence, were not exposed to the public and were
to be preserved as private.

Hence, the surveillance made by two

police officers who were eavesdropping without a search warrant
by sitting on the appellant's window ledge for several hours two
stories above the ground, peering into his kitchen in the middle
of the night and mentally recording his private conversations and
movements so as to produce them at trial, constituted a shocking
invasion of the appellant's privacy and an illegal search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and Article One, Section 14
of the Federal and State Constitutions, respectively.

The illegal

search and seizure was made prior to arrest, by means of the surveillance
despite non-entry by the police.

Because the evidence obtained as a

result of an invasion of the appellant's privacy was admitted at
trial after a suppression hearing and over objections made by appellant's
counsel, the appellant's conviction must be reversed.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Katz decision and the rationale of Kent have been
applied in many cases where the factual setting has been strikingly
similar to that of the present case.

In Lorenzana v. Superior Court,

9 Cal 3rd 626, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973), the California
Supreme Court held that evidence, both audio and visual, obtained as
the result of police peering into the defendant's apartment, was the
product of an illegal search and seizure and inadmissible at trial.
The police in Lorenzana peeked through the defendant's window
and observed him emptying some powdery contents of a tied-off rubber
balloon onto a newspaper.

Concluding that the substance was heroin,

the police entered the apartment, arrested the defendant, and seized
narcotics.

Considering the Fourth Amendment claims made by the defendant,

the court ruled that the observations made and the conversations
overheard by the police who were standing next to the house in an area
not open to public use were the products of an illegal search and
seizure.

If the surveillance had been made from an area normally used

by the public, the evidence received therefrom would have been
legally obtained and admissible at trial. But because the evidence
was obtained by police stationed at a non-public vantage point, the
surveillance activities constituted an illegal search and seizure of
the defendant's conversations and movements. Holding that the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy had been invaded, the court excluded
the testimony of the police officers at trial.

-9-
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The facts of the present case likewise indicate that police
observed movements and overheard conversations from a vantage point
outside the realm of public use and access.

One would be hard pressed

to conclude that the appellant would expect that members of the public
would normally peek into his second story apartment window at 2:00 a.m.
in the morning.

Therefore, according to Lorenzana, any evidence,

whether audio or visual, obtained by the police as a result: of the
use of their non-public vantage point, located on the window ledge
of a private apartment two stories above the ground at 2:00 a.m.
must be excluded at trial. Katz properly applies in such a situation
and hence the trial court's finding that the evidence so obtained was
admissible constitutes reversible error.
The assertion that the police had been authorized by the owner
of the Rio Grand Products Building to use its roof for the purpose
of observing prostitutes on the street below, does not vitiate the
unlawful intrusion into the defendant's privacy, even though
initial police observerations were made from the roof of the Rio Grand
Building and not from the defendant's window ledge.

The test for

determining the legality of police surveillance activities is not
whether the police had permission to use a non public vantage point,
but

whether the vantage point was in fact not normally used by or

accessable to the public such that its use by the police would be
an invasion of privacy reasonably to be expected by appellant.
In

People v. Fly, 34 Cal. App. 3rd 665, 110 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1973),

the police received permission from defendant! s neighbor to use his (the
neighbor's) backyard

as a vantage point for observing plants growing

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in the defendant's backvard.

The nnlicc*

a t-pipcrrmo fn

identify the plants as marijuana and then arrested the defendant.
In refusing to decide whether the use of the telescope was unlawful,
the court concluded:
M

We do not reach that issue [regarding the telescope]
because we conclude that, on the record in this case, the
evidence supports the finding that the officer viewed
the yard on both occassions, from a vantage point as
to which the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy."
(110 Cal. Rptr. at 159) (Emphasis Supplied).
According to Fly, it makes no difference that police have
permission to use a particular vantage point for observations.
With or without permission, if the vantage point is one as to which the
defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, any evidence
obtained by the police from that vantage point has been obtained as
the result of an unwarranted invasion upon the defendants privacy.
If an invasion of privacy has been made, it is of no significance that
police had non-judicial permission to make that invasion.
A test has been formulated for determining whether police
surveillance from a particular vantage point is an unreasonable
invasion of the privacy of those being observed.

In Cohen v. Superior

Court, 5 Cal. pp. 3rd 429, 85 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1970), the police observed
illegal drugs on a table inside the defendant's home by standing on
the fire escape of an apartment building and looking through the window
of the defendant's fourth story apartment.

The court, in determining

the legality vel non of the surveillance, expressed the following
test:

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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M

The test to be applied in determining whether observations
into a residence violates the Fourth Amendment is whether
there has been an unreasonable invasion of the privacy ot
the occupants, not the extent of the trespass which was
necessary to reach the observation point. (85 Cal. Rptr.
at 358) (Emphasis Supplied).
"
Applying Fly, and the test of Cohen, to the present case, it
becomes immaterial that the police obtained permission to use the
roof of an adjacent building as a vantage point.

The material

conclusion thatmust be reached is that the police, even while they
were on the roof of the adjacent building and before they sat down
on the appellant's window ledge, were utilizing a non-public vantage
point as to which the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Regardless of any non-judicial permission to use the roof any observations
made therefrom constituted an illegal search and seizure because the police
had not received judicial authorization to utilize a non public
vantage point as to which the defendant and other occupants of his
second story apartment nearby would have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.

Cohen and Fly, supra.

Therefore, to protect the appellant's

and the public's constitutional right of privacy, precious to a free and
open society, his conviction must be reversed.

Katz, supra, See also

Olivera v. State, 315 So. 2d 487 (Fla. App. 1975), Storry v. State,
452 P. 2d 822 (Okl. Cir. 1969), Pate v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal App
3rd 721, 89 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970).

-12-
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POINT II
THE SEARCH OF THE APPELLANT'S BEDROOM AFTER HE HAD BEEN
ARRESTED AND HANDCUFFED IN THE KITCHEN WAS BEYOND THE AREA
WITHIN HIS IMMEDIATE CONTROL, AND THEREFORE VIOLATED HIS
RIGHT TO PRIVACY, SO THAT ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT
THEREOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED AT TRIAL.
In dealing with the law of search and seizure as mandated
by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
constitution and Article One, Section Fourteen of the Utah Constitution
we begin with the proposition that any search conducted outside of
the judicial process is per se unreasonable.
9, 432 P.2d 64 (1967).

State v. Kent, 20 U.2d,

The rule has long been established that

whenever practicable an officer must secure a search warrant before
intruding into constitutionally protected areas. Trupiano v . United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).

The interposition of a neutral and

detached magistrate at the point where the probable cause determination
is made is essential to safeguard an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights because a police officer's judgment is necessarily colored by
his prior involvement in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime.,f

Johnson v. United States, 333 10, 14 (1948).

The Court

enunciated this principle in McDonald v. United States, 334 U.S. 451
(1948):
!f

We are not dealing with formalities. The presence of a search
warrant serves a high function. Absent some grave emergency,
the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between
the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield crimina
nor to make the home a safe haven for illegal activities.
It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the need
to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law. The right
of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the
discretion
ofby the
those
whose
job
theClark
detection
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arrest of criminals . . . And so the constitution requires a
magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they viol

the privacy of the home. We cannot be true to the constitutional
requirement and excuse the absence of a search warrant without
a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional
mandate that the exigencies of the situation made that course
imperative."
(334 U.S. at 455, 456)
Moreover, the burden of justifying such an extra-judicial
search falls squarely upon the State.
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).

United States v. Jeffers,

To meet this burden the State must: bring

the search within one of the time tested and well qualified exceptions
to the search warrant requirement.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

U.S. 443 (1971).
One such exception to the warrant requirement is a limited search
incident to a lawful arrest.

The seminal case on this issue is

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).

In that case police officers

armed with an arrest warrant arrived at the defendant's home, identified
themselves to the defendant's wife, and requested and received
permission to wait inside the home for the defendant. When the
defendant arrived, he was placed under arrest, and permission was
requested

to fflook around11.

Over the defendant's objection, the police

conducted an intensive search of the entire house.

Although no

search warrant had been issued the police justified the search as one
incident to a lawful arrest.

After completing the search which occupied

between forty-five and sixty minutes the police seized numerous
items.

At his trial, the State introduced a number of the items

which had been seized during the warrantless search of his home.
On appeal, the defendant attacked his conviction on the ground that
the aforementioned items had been unconstitutionally seized.
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The United States Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that
the search had exceeded the constitutionally permissible scope
of a search incident to an arrest.

After a review of the case law

which had uniformly emphasized the preference for a judicially
approved search warrant, the court explained that the exigencies of
the arrest situation mandated a limited exception to the warrant
requirement.
The Court felt that a limited search for weapons and destructible
evidence justified dispensing with the warrant requirement at the
point of arrest. However, in defining the constitutionally permissible
scope of such a search, the court emphasized that the search incident
to a lawful arrest must be "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.ff
762).

(395 U.S. at

Based on this principle, the Court concluded that a search of

the defendants entire house following his arrest exceeded the limited
scope of the very specific purpose which justified dispensing with the
warrant requirement for a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest.
Mindful that neither the premeditated nor the fortuitous circumstances
of being arrested in one's home should license law enforcement
officials to conduct general searches unsupported by probable cause,
the court precluded this possibility by carefully circumscribing
the scope of the search incident to a lawful arrest as limited to the
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control construing
that phrase to mean "the area from within which he might gain possession
of a weapon or destructible evidence."

(395 U.S. at 736). Seeking
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to preserve the Fourth Amendment protections by removing all doubt
as to what are the outer limits of the phrase "immediate control,11
the court went on to say:
There is no comparable justification, however, for
routinely searching any room other than that in which
an arrest occurs . . . . Such searches, in the absence
of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under
the authority of a search warrant. The "adherence to
the judicial processes" mandated by the Fourth Amendment
requires no less. (395 U.S. at 763)
Specifically rejecting the state's contention that a search of
a man's house when he is arrested is "reasonable11, the Court
stated/'Under such an unconfined analysis Fourth Amendment protection
in this area would approach the evaporation point."
Accord:

(395 U.S. at 765).

Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970).

Thus, it is eminently clear that the mandate of the Fourth
Amendment, as interpreted and applied to the states

through the

Fourteenth Amendment by the United States Supreme Court in Chime1
prohibits precisely that type of warrantless search and seizure as was
conducted in the instant case.

The appellant was arrested and

handcuffed along with all the other arrestees in his kitchen (R. 6,
94, 99). Following his arrest in the kitchen, one of the officers made
2. This Court has also ruled such broad scale searches after an arrest
to be unreasonable. State v. Richards, 26 Utah 2d 318, 489 P.2d 422 (1971
ruled a search of the" defendant's vehicle parked across the
street from his home unreasonable, after defendant's arrest pursuant
to a warrant.
-16-
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a search of the apartment (R. 84) and seized an amber colored bottle
found in the bedroom (R. 6) . It was -••. subsequently determined
that the bottle contained gelatin capsules of heroin used as evidence
against the appellant at his trial.
Moreover, the scope of an unwarranted search incident to an
arrest as delineated in Chime1 applies with particularly compelling
force to the facts of the instant case.

Significantly, the Chime1

court specifically overruled both Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145 (1947), and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
Rabinowitz involved the search of a single room incident to an arrest;
Harris involved the search of a four-room apartment incident to an
arrest.

In both cases, the searches were predicated on the principle

that law enforcement authorities had M[t]he right Tto search the place
where the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected
with the crime . . . ." (339 U.S. at 61).

The Chime1 Court specifically

rejected this reasoning.
The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the warrantless
search of the appellant's bedroom when he was arrested, handcuffed,
and restrained by a police officer cannot be justified as a search
incident to an arrest.

Indeed, the search and seizure in the

instant case falls precisely into that category of general exploratory
searches condemned by the Chime1 Court in construing the Fourth
Amendment:
Application of sound Fourth Amendment principles to the
facts of this case produces a clear result. The search
here went far beyond the petitioner's person and the area
from within which he might have obtained either a weapon
or something that could have been used as evidence against
him. There was no constitutional justification, in the absence
of a search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.
The scope of the search was, therefore, ''unreasonable" under
the Fourth
and
Fourteenth
Amendments.
(395
at 768)
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Failing to qualify as a Msearch incident to an arrest" exception
to the warrant requirement, the Court in Chime1 made it clear in
that the police should have obtained a search warrant before violating
the petitioner's privacy any further.

In the instant case, the

police failed to do so. Appellant contends that Chime1 and the
great weight of authority support the contention that this failure
to obtain a search warrant was fatal to the search of the bedroom.
As the Court stated:
The State has made various subsidiary contentions,
including arguments that it would have been unduly
burdensome to obtain a warrant specifying the coins
to be seized and that introduction of the fruits of
the search was harmless error. We reject those
contentions as being without merit. (395 U.S. at 768
fn. 16)
Appellant's contention that the search of his bedroom was
beyond the area within his immediate control is buttressed by
a decision from our own Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In United States
v. Baca, 417 F. 2d 103 (10th Cir. 1969), the court concluded that the
area within an arrestee's immediate control could be diminished when
an arrestee was handcuffed with his hands behind his back.

In Baca

the appellant was arrested in his home for a parole violation.

After

handcuffing the appellant behind his back, his apartment was thoroughly
searched by the arresting officers.

The search included the inside of

bureau drawers, night stand, and under the bed.

The court concluded that

these and any similar areas were hardly under Many type of control by
Baca inasmuch as he was handcuffed with his hands behind his back
and was unable even to dress himself." (417 F.2d at 105). In reversing
and remanding the case, the Tenth Circuit went on to refer to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Chimel

case for the additional proposition that the general requirement

that a search warrant be obtained is not to be lightly dispensed with.
In this light, the Court stated that it was difficult to understand
how or why it was not practicable for one of the officers to obtain
a search warrant based on the probable cause which they had
obtained by entering the Baca's apartment to effect his arrest. The
ratio decidendi enunciated in Baca clearly inheres in the instant
case where the challenged search of the bedroom followed the
appellantfs arrest and handcuffing behind his back in a kitchen of
his apartment.

(R. 6, 7, 94, 99).

This court has also had occassion to pass on a Chimel problem
in State v. Sims, 30 U. 2d 251, 516 P.2d 354 (1973).

In that case, when

the defendant-suspect went to his bedroom to change his clothes, the
police accompanied him for their own protection.

Upon entering the

bedroom, evidence later introduced at the defendantfs trial came into the
officer's Mplain view."

Justice Crockett, writing for the court,

reasoned that the intrusion into the bedroom was justified under the
rationale of Chimel to prevent the defendant-suspect from either
escaping or obtaining a weapon.

Sims may stand for the proposition

that the area within an arresteefs immediate control was not limited to
the room in which the arrest was made if the arrestee was not
restrained and could still move from room to room.

However, Sims is

distinguishable from the instant case for two obvious reasons. First,
the gravamen of the Chimel exception to the warrant requirement is that
the exigencies inhering in the arrest situation necessitate a limited
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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search.

In Sims, the defendant was not under arrest when the police

accompanied him into the bedroom.

Second, in Sims the defendant-suspect

had essentially unrestrained freedom of movement in his apartment
since he was not under arrest or otherwise in custody.

In the instant

case, the appellant was both under arrest and handcuffed behind his
back.

Baca stands for the proposition that the area within the appellant*

immediate control, if anything, is diminished under such circumstances.
The burden is on the State to demonstrate what exemption
from the requirement that a search warrant be obtained justifies
the warrantless search in the instant case.
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).

United States v. Jeffers,

The testimony at the trial offers no

explanation for the search of the appellant's bedroom (R. 84). In the
absence of some legitimate justification by the police for invading
the appellant's privacy the search and seizure must be deemed to be
unconstitutional, and the fruits of the illegal search should have been
suppressed by the trial court. Wong Sun v. United States 371 U.S.
471 (1963).

The introduction of the tainted fruits constituted

prejudicial error and hence the Appellants convictions should be
reversed.
POINT III
THERE BEING NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT THE AMBER
COLORED BOTTLE CONTAINED CONTRABAND, WEAPONS, OR EVIDENCE
OF A CRIME, THE OFFICER'S EXAMINATION AND INTRUSION INTO
THE BOTTLE WAS UNREASONABLE, M P THUS THE SUBSEQUENT
SEIZURE OF THIS ITEH" WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID~
The United States Supreme Court and this Court carving out the
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indicated that contraband, evidence and weapons which are in Mplain
view" may be seized.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 402 U.S. 443 (1971).

State v. Sims, 30 U.2d 251, 516 P.2d 354 (1973).

However, such

"plain view11 seizures are constitutionally reasonable under Coolidge
only if four conditions are met:

(1) The officer must be "lawfully

present" where the search and seizure take place; (2) The seizable
object must be in plain view; (3) Its incriminating nature must be
immediately apparent; and (4) Its discovery must be "inadvertent."
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, and Ringel, Searches, Seizures, Arrests
and Confessions Section 162 (1975 Supp. at 94).
The appellant submits that the search and seizure in the instant
case must fall on all four grounds enumerated above.
in Point U

The discussion

of this brief discusses the question of whether the

officer was "lawfully present" in the bedroom; he was not. The
officer, having listened outside the appellantfs apartment for
several hours prior to gaining entrance through the bedroom window,
knew that no confederates were in the bedroom (R. 6, 82, 83) when he
walked into the bedroom to conduct the search (R. 84). Thus, the State
cannot justify the intrusion into the bedroom on the ground that it was
necessary for the safety of the officers.
Moreover, the testimony from the suppression hearing and
the trial supports the appellantfs position that the search and seizure
in the instant case must fall on grounds "two", "three", and "four"
above.
Even assuming arguendo that the object was in plain view, it may
not be seized
apparent.

unless its incriminating nature is immediately

Ringel,
supra
at W.62.
The
purpose
of
requirement as stated
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by the Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, is to prevent the plain
view exception from being used Mto extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at
last emerges."

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 444, 466 (1971).3

It was only on this basis that the Court allowed the seizure of
"mere evidence" in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).

In that case

the Court upheld the reasonableness of the warrantless seizure of the
clothes of an arrested robbery suspect, where the clothes matched the
description of the robbers1 clothes and fell into "plain view" upon
the arrest of the suspect.

The crucial point is that plain view

seizures are allowed as constitutionally reasonable when and only
when probable cause exists to believe the item is seizable.

As was

stated by the Court in Sanford v. Texas 379 U.S. 476 (1965):
The Fourth Amendment prohibits general warrants giving
inferior officials roving commission to search where and
to seize what they please. 43"! The necessity of the illegal nature of the object being readily
apparent is supported by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart
in Stanley v. Georgia, 374 U.S. 557 (1967) which is cited with approval
in the Coolidge case. In Stanley officials who had entered a building
under the color of a lawfully procured search warrant specifying
gambling equipment also seized several reels of film which on their face
were not objectionable. Subsequently the defendants were charged with the
possession of obscene film. Justice Stexvart in an opinion joined by
Brennan and White, J.J. described the seizure of the film as "unwarranted
and unconstitutional" because "[t]his is not a case inhere agents in the
course of a lawful search came upon contraband, criminal activity, or
criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that the
contents of the films could not be determined by mere inspection." (394
U.S. at 571, Stewart J. concurring). Accord: Shipman v. Alabama,
Ala., 282 So. 2d 700 (1973); Armour v. Totty, Tenn., 486 S.W. 2d 537 (1972
4. Or as indicated in Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967) in the
context of electronic surveillance searches and seizures, the requirement
of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution that a search warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized prevents the^ seizure of one
by the Howard
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Marron v. United States. 275 U.S. 192. 196 C1927}

The colloquy between the officer who conducted the warrantless
seizure and the defense attorney at the suppression motion amply
illustrates that the facts in the instant case do not establish the
plain view exception (R.6,7):
Q.

What made you pick up that bottle?
Why did you pick that bottle up?

A.

It was there, so I picked it up.

Q.

Did you see what was in it before you picked
it up?

A.

No, the room was dark, and it was in an amber
bottle, and that's why I picked it up to look.

Thus, because the bedroom was dark and the bottle was amber, the officer
did not know what it contained when it fell into his sight; in fact by
his own admission he had no idea what it contained.
a table is not incriminating on its face.

A bottle sitting on

The plain view exception

requires that the officer must have an immediate knowledge that the seized
item is contraband, evidence, or a weapon.

That is to say, before

governmental authorities may seize evidence or search into containers
they must have probable cause to believe that (1) the containers contain
contraband and (2) that the substance or evidence is in fact seizable as
fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence of a crime. By the
officerfs own testimony that knowledge is absent in the instant case.5
5"! The Utah plain view cases are not to the contrary: State v. Martinez
23 U.2d 62, 457 P.2d 613 (1969), involved a trench coat resembling that
worn by the robber; State v. Allred, 16 U.2d 41, 395 P.2d 535 (1964),
involved safety boots and coveralls matching the description of those
stolen in a burglary; State v. Martinez, 28 U.2d 80, 498 P.2d 651 (1972),
involved stolen stereo tape deck and two tapes; and State v. Sims, supra
involved long strands of light brown hair matching those of the
victim.
-23-
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In all of the Utah cases, the incriminating nature of the seized item
was readily apparent to the police officers. No investigation or
examination of the item was necessary to ascertain its incriminating
character.

The necessity of the apparent character or identity of

the seized item is fundamtental to the concept of plain view.
Certainly the common sense connotation of the phrase as well as the
well developed case law requires no less.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has followed this rationale
as well.

In Faubion v. United States, 424 F. 2d 437 (10th Cir. 1970),

the court speaking through Circuit Judge Hicky, suppressed weapons
seized in the warrantless search of the defendants luggage where there
was apparently no probable cause to search the luggage and no
reason for the government agents to have failed to attempt to procure
a search warrant.

As was noted in that case:

The fact that the police have custody of a prisoner's
property for the purpose of protecting it while he is
incarcerated does not alone constitute a basis for the
exception to the warrant requirement. Preston v. United
States 376 U.S. 369 . . . Brett v. United States, 4EZ
—
F. 2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1 9 W T
"
In a case factually close to the one at the bar, the Court
of appeals of Maryland held the search and concommitant seizure of
marijuana and methadone unreasonable.
420, 269 A. 2d 870 (1970).

Taylor v. State 9 Md. App.

In Taylor, the defendant was lawfully

stopped by a uniformed police officer and was asked to show the
officer his drivers license and registration card.

While talking to

the defendant the officer noticed some brown envelopes and opened
them.

The envelopes and their contents were then seized and further

analysis showed that they contained marijuana and methadone which
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formed the basis of the defendant's conviction.
In reversing the defendant's conviction the court stated
the issue as follows:
The officers right to seize the brown envelopes within
the car was not therefore dependent upon or limited
by the rules authorizing searches and seizures incident
to a valid arrest; it depended upon whether he had
probable cause to believe that the brown envelopes
observed within the vehicle contained prohibited narcotics.
(264 A.2d at 873) (Emphasis Supplied).
The court concluded that on the record there was no showing
of the requisite probable cause to know the envelopes contained
prohibited and thus seizable narcotics. Although conceeding that
the officer's expertise in such matters was important, the court
concluded that from the record there was no showing of such expertise
and that the conclusory statement of the officer was not a sufficient
foundation upon which a showing of probable cause could be based:
As heretofore indicated Officer
Puepke testified that
from his "past experience,ff he knew that the ubrown
envelopes" which he observed "are used for narcotic drugs."
He did not state the basis for or any facts supporting
his mere conclusion, nor was his expertise in the field
sought to be established. In short, beyond Officer Puepkefs
"take it or leave it" conclusion that the brown envelopes
were used for narcotics, there was nothing before the trialf
judge to permit him to intelligently assess whether Puepke s
belief had a factual basis amounting to probable cause in the
constitutional context. (264 A.2d at 893)
In the instant case there is no showing of even such a mere
conclusion of expertise.

On the contrary, the officer testified

that he picked up the bottle because it was there, and for no other
reason.

Applying the rationale of Taylor to the evidence in the

instant case the evidence must likewise be suppressed.
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Another case similar to the instant one, which predates
Taylor also supports the contention of the appellant herein.

In

Carver v. Kropp, 306 F. Supp 1329 (U.S.D.C.E.D. Mich. 1969) the
defendant had been arrested for attempted rape, inter alia.
Incident to the arrest the officer searched the defendant discovering
five two-inch by three-inch envelopes and what appeared to be a
large amount of money.

Upon finding these items the defendant

became highly upset and started to stutter and stammer.
Supp. at 1330).

(306 F.

The officer opened the envelopes and found what

proved to be heroin.

The District Court upon defense motion

suppressed the evidence at the Habeas Corpus hearing, finding the
search and seizure constitutionally impermissible.
Noting that each envelope was not transparent and that each
envelope contained approximately one tablespoon of heroin per
envelope, and that there was no showing that the officer had any
basis for believing the envelopes contained heroin, the Court
suppressed the evidence.
When the officer discovered the sealed envelope, did he
have reasonable grounds to believe that the possession
of the envelope was itself a felony?
The envelope was not transparent and there was no
trace of its contents on its outside. At the suppression
hearing the officer did not claim that before he opened
the envelope he thought it contained narcotics. In any
event, it appears that before he opened the envelope the
officer had at most a suspicion not reasonable cause to
believe that it contained narcotics.
The officer apparently thought he had a right to
open the envelope because, as he testified, Mthe duties
of a police officer are to seize any offensive weapons
or incriminating articles from a defendant before he has
a chance to dispose of them.n A police officer does not,
however, have a right as an incident of an arrest to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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conduct a general search for incriminating articles . . .
[citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] . . .
In this case the officer did not believe that the
envelope contained a weapon and he did not have the right
to open the envelope. Accordingly, I hold that the search
of the envelope was unreasonable. (306 F. Supp. at 1331)
Of note also is the case of State v. Gwinn, Del. Supr. 301
A.2d at 91 (1973) where the Supreme Court of Delaware suppressed
marijuana seized pursuant to an inventory of the defendant's
vehicle.

The court noted that although the police had the right to

lawfully inventory the impounded vehicle, there was no reason to
search a satchel found in the vehicle's locked trunk.

The record

in that case indicated nothing unusual or suspicious about the
satchel, and that although the satchel was plainly visible its
contents were not.

(301 A.2d at 294).

The court ruled:

This brings us to the question of whether the contents of
the closed satchel found in the trunk of the automobile
came within the "plain view" doctrine. We think not.
The record indicates nothing unusual or suspicious about
the satchel. While the satchel itself was in "plain
view" of the officer as he inventoried the contents of this
auto trunk, the contents of the satchel were not in his
"plain view" and do not fall within that doctrine.
The opening of the satchel and an inventory of its
contents were not necessary for the stated protective
purpose. An effective sealing device or chain-lock
device suitable for suitcases and other baggage found in a
motor vehicle during an inventory would have sufficed
for the security purposes sought. A detailed inventory
of the contents of baggage appear to be an impractical and
unnecessary, and therefore unreasonable, intrusion under
the circumstances. Baggage usually contains innumerable
personal items. The police should be relieved of the
too-burdensome obligation of such inventory; and the
citizen should be relieved of such impractical and unnecessary
intrusion of his privacy. In this connection, it is
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noteworthy that towaway and impoundment are daily
consequences of certain parking violations. ,
(301 A.2d at 294). b
Perhaps the seminal case on this issue comes from the State
of Oregon.

In State v. Elkins 245 Or. 279, 422 P.2d 250 (1966) the

defendant was arrested for public intoxication and a search of his
person uncovered an unlabelledbottlexontaining three kinds of
capsules and pills. The officer testified he seized the pills
because he was suspicious and not because he recognized them as
contraband.

On analysis the pills proved to be unlawfully possessed

methadone.

The Oregon Supreme Court held the seizure of the substance

unlawful on the ground that ffbefore the Officer had the right to
seize the implements of a crime committed in his presence, other
than that for which the arrest was made, he must have reasonable

6. In circumstances similar to those in the instant case
the Supreme Court of Alaska, in Erickson v. State, Alaska, 507
P.2d 598 (1973) refused to approve the seizure of marijuana
discovered in a suitcase. The court reasoned that it was
the suitcase and not the marijuana which was in plain view and
absent articulable reasons for believing the suitcase contained
contraband the intrusive search of its contents was unjustified
and hence unreasonable. The California Supreme Court in a
similar situation also refused to apply the ,fplain view11
exception. People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 442 P.2d
665 (1968).
Also in People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975), the court held that the State
was not allowed to justify the opening and searching of an opague
plastic bottle on the exception to the warrant requirement for
objects or contraband falling in plain view.
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grounds to believe that the article is contraband.' (422 P.2d at
252) the court stated the policy behind its ruling as follows:
If the rule were otherwise an officer who desired to
inculpate an arrested person in another crime, could seize
everything in such person's immediate possession and control
upon the prospect that on further investigation some of it
might prove to have been stolen or to be contraband. It
would open the door to complete temporary confiscation of
all an arrested person's property which was in his immediate
possession and control at the time of his arrest for the
purposes of a minute examination of it in an effort to
connect him with another crime. Such a practice would be
as much an exploratory seizure as one made upon an arrest
for which no probable cause existed. Intolerable invasions
of a person's property rights would be invited by an ex-post
facto authorization of a seizure made on groundless suspicion
. . . If contraband may be legally seized when the officer
does not have reasonable grounds to believe it is such,
7. The case is examined in Kamisar et. al., Modern Criminal Procedure
(1974) at 332 n. 5. And, the principle has been recognized by the
commentators as a correct statement of search and seizure doctrine.
For example, in an annotation lfSearch and Seizure-Plain View,"
29 L. Ed. 2d 1067, the following comment appears: "It has been suggested
that even if an object is observed in 'plain view,' the 'plain view'
doctrine will not justify seizure of the object where the incriminating
nature of the object is not apparent from the 'plain view1 of the
object.n (Emphasis Supplied)
See Comment, "Probable Cause to Seize and the Fourth Amendment:
An Analysis," 34 Albany L. Rev. 658 (1970). This comment explores
precisely the issue at bar, i.e., "the status of a seizure where the
seizing officer did not know, or have probable cause to believe, that
the item seized was a fruit, instrumentality, or contraband evidencing
another crime." The author's conclusion is that such a seizure contravenes the Fourth Amendment. More recent writings on the subject
simply accept this principle as a settled rule. See e.g. Knipers,
"Suspicious Objects Probable Cause, and the Law of Search and Seizure,"
"21 Drake L. Rev. 252, 263 (1972); Scurlock, "Basic Principles of the
Administration of Criminal Justice with Particular Reference to Missouri
Law." 38 U. Mo. Kansas City 167, 198 (1970); Comment, "Search and Seizure
Probable Cause for Seizure," 7 Suffolk.- U.L.Rev. 184 190 (1972) Rintamaki,
"Plain View Searching," 60 Military L Rev. 25, 39 (197377
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it will lead to many interferences with property when the
officer's groundless suspicions are wrong. Nor can we be sure
that the prevention of indiscriminate seizures of property
upon lawful arrest will have no effect upon rights of privacy.
If indiscriminate seizures are allowed upon lawful arrest
it will tend to promote more arrests upon tenuous fanciful
grounds. (422 P.2d at 254)
Numerous other cases have followed the Elkins rationale.
The Courts of Alabama, Delaware, Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho and
Maryland have explicitly

rejected the idea that

officers may seize

objects ori suspicion and in following Elkins have required a probable
cause determination before an object may be seized.

This Court has

apparently not ruled on the precise issue.
In State v. Harwood, 94 Idaho 615, 495 P.2d 160 (1972), the
Supreme Court of Idaho in an able opinion by Mr. Justice Shepard
specifically followed Elkins in a case factually different than that
at the bar.

In Harwood the defendant's conviction for illegal possession

of a game animal was reversed where the game warden was not able to show
articulable facts which indicated that the seized animal carcass was
in fact contraband.

(495 P.2d at 164). Similarly in People v, LaRocco,

178 Colo. 196, 496 P.2d 314 (1972) the defendants conviction for
forgery of an out of state drivers license was reversed.

In

LaRocco, the police pursuant to a search warrant seized an Illinois
drivers license inter alia when the warrant specified other instrumentalities and evidence.

The court rejected the states argument that the

"plain view11 doctrine justified the seizure of the Illinois license,
noting that "officers merely suspected the license of being contraband
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and that not having been specified in warrant" a nexus must have been
shown connecting it with the criminal activity being investigated
under the search warrant." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294."
2d at 316).

(496 P.

The court stated the basis of its ruling as follows:

To countenance seizure of evidence not specified in
the warrant and unrelated to the criminal matters under
investigation would open wide the doors to general
searches and seizures based upon mere suspicion but not
upon probable cause as constitutionally required . . .
[Quoting from Mr. Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Stanley v. Georgia, supra] . . .
Not having demonstrated that the items here seized
were fruits, instrumentalities, contraband, or evidence
connected with the criminal activity being investigated under
the search warrant, and no probable cause being shown for
their seizure, the order of suppression was proper.
(496 P.2d at 316).
In the same factual context see also Young v. State, Del. Supr.
339 A.2d 723 (1975) and State v. Paul, 80 N.M. 521, 458 P.2d 596
(1969).

In Young, a prosecution from misdemeanor theft, the Delaware

Supreme Court held the seizure unreasonable where officers who justifiably
detained the defendant and saw a television set in his car, did not
have probable cause to seize the set.

In Paul, the New Mexico Court,

suppressed the seizure of the defendants trousers and boots which
were not specified in a search warrant authorizing a search of the
defendants premises for coins taken in a school burglary.

The Court

suppressed the evidence indicating that the plain view doctrine without
more (probable cause) would not justify such a seizure.
In cases factually more apposite to the one at the bar, the
courts have followed the Elkins rule.

Shipman v. State, 282 So. 2d

700 (1973), Dixon v. State, 23 Md. App. 19, 327 A.2d 516 (1974), State
v. Florance, Or.Digitized
App.,
575 P.2d 195 (1972) revfd other grds. 527 P.2d
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195 (1974) and United States v. Thomas, 16 U.S. CM.A. 306, 36 C.M.R.
462 (1966).

An extensive review of the facts of each case appears

unnecessary, basically each case concerned the seizure of substances
which government agents suspected to be contraband drugs. Mr. Justice
Bloodworth in Shipman v. State provides an exhaustive review of the cases
in their factual context.**
In each case the Court reversed specifically citing to
Elkins inter alia for the proposition that before officers may seize
evidence of other crimes they must have probable cause to believe the
evidence is in fact contraband.

In each case the testimony was similar

(if not approaching the identical) to that of Officer Niemann in the
instant case.9
W. In Thomas military officers seized a bottle which was subsequently
found to contain heroin. In Dixon officers seized pills which were
found to be barbituates. In Florence the material seized was from
plastic bags containing what proved to be cocaine. In Shipman
the evidence was contained in cellophane bags which proved to be
heroin.
9. In Thomas "there was no evidence that Lively or Tarvin [the
arresting officers] suspected the accused of using or possessing
narcotics or had any reason on which to base such a conclusion11
(36 CMR at 463). In Dixon Officer Greisz testified that he had
,f
no idea" what the pills were but seized them as part of the police
departments inventory procedure and then "decided to have them tested"
(327 A.2d at 523). In Florence there was no evidence that the officer
recognized the substance as illegal contraband (515 P.2d at 197, 200).
The Supreme Court of Oregon found that on the record the officer
had sufficient expertise to determine the evidence to be contrabandbut did not disturb its holding in Elkins (527 P.2d at 1212). In
Shipman the officer who saw the cellophane bags "testified he did not
know what was in the packages except that it appeared to be some white
substance. At one point he indicated it was white powder/' (282
So. 2d at 701).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-32-

In all the cases the Court suppressed the evidence seized
and based their deicsions on the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and
the analogus state constitutional provisions which exist in an effort
to prevent general exploratory searches.

In all the cases direct

authority from the United States Supreme Court was indicated as
controlling.

The Coolidge opinion, Marron v. United States,and Mr.

Justice Stewart's concurrence in Stanley v. Georgia were deemed
controlling.

The reason for the rule is nowhere bettet stated

than by Mr. Justice Bloodworth and cited with approval by the
Maryland Court in Dixon v. State:
The reason for this rule is apparent. If the rule
were otherwise, an officer, acting on mere groundless
suspicion, could seize anything and everything belonging
to an individual which happened to be in plain
view on the prospect that on further investigation some
of it might prove to have been stolen or to be contraband.
It would open the door to unreasonable confiscation of
a person's property while a minute examination of it
is made in an effort to find something criminal. Such
a practice would amount to the fgeneral exploratory
incriminating at last emerges1 which was condemned in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra. Ex post facto justification
of a seizure made on mere groundless suspicion, is totally
contrary to the basic tenets of the Fourth Amendment.
For an item in plain view to be validly seized, the
officer must possess some judgment at the time that the
object to be seized is contraband and that judgment
must be grounded upon probable cause. (282 So. 2d at 704
and 327 A.2d at 524).
Finally, the intrusion into the bedroom and the seizure
of the bottle only after the officer examined the bottle to ascertain
what it contained belies that the discovery of its contents was
not

ff

inadvertent."

Inherent in the concept of the plain view exception

to the requirement that a warrant be obtained before invading a
defendant's privacy is the idea that without any purpose or effort
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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by the officer, an item of an incriminating nature falls inadvertently
into his sight.

Since the officer could not ascertain what was

in the bottle, when the bottle fell into his sight, and because the
bottle, was not itself plainly contrband, evidence, or a weapon,
the officer was prohibited from examining it. At the point
that the officer picked up the bottle, he lacked probable cause to
seize the item.

Picking up the bottle and carefully scrutinizing

it to determine what it was is not an inadvertent happening upon
evidence.

The examination of the bottle can be analogized to the opening

of a drawer or of a box to ascertain what they contain.

Neither

opening a box, nor opening a drawer, nor inspecting a bottle innocuous
on its face fall within the ambit of the plain view exception.
The search of and subsequent seizure of the bottle and
its contents, which was

subsequently determined to be the heroin

which forms the basis of the charge in the instant case, cannot
be justified under the plain view seizure as constitutionally
justified.
CONCLUSION
Whenever, the State seeks entry into one's home for the seizure
of the fruits, instrumentalities, evidence of a crime or other
contraband it must do so within the ambit of a judicially secured
and valid search warrant or one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement.

Searches and seizures, particularly of one's abode,

conducted outside of the warrant requirement bear a stigma of

-34-
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illegality which can be justified as reasonable only when the State
bears its burden of bringing it within the time tested exceptions
to the warrant requirement of both Federal and State Constitutions.
No such reasonable exception to the warrant requirement exists in the
instant case ,the initial intrusion into the privacy of the defendant1 s
home was unjustified and not based upon articulable probable cause
offerred for the scrutiny of a magistrate.

Hence, the fruits of

such an intrusive observation must be suppressed as evidence for use
at trial.

Importantly, the intrusion in the instant case was

unreasonable not only in the initial abrogation of the appellant's
reasonable expectation of privacy, but also in its intrusive scope
after the appellant's arrest, in his own home.

The search of the entire

home after appellant's arrest and detention in one room, and the
seizure of unknown items, which by happenstance turned out to be
heroin capsules, smack of the baseless exploratory searches which were
at one time justified by overbroad writs of assistance.

The search

of the appellant's home and the contents of that home in the instant
case was unreasonable as that term is used in the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article One, Section
Fourteen of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and hence evidence
seized pursuant to that search should have been excluded at appellant's
trial.

Failure to exclude such evidence constituted reversible error

on the part of the Court below.
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For the reasons stated, it is requested that the judgment of
the trial court be reversed and the appellant granted a new trial.
DATED this /

day of

January

, 1977.

Respectfully submitte

W. KUNKLER
attorney for Appellant
i

RONALD J. YENGICH
.!
Attorney for Appellant
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